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Abstract 
 
As the title indicates, this contribution explores a semiotic 
notion of transcendence. It is argued that experiences of trans-
cendence are quite common and that notions of transcendence 
are highly significant since they provide a frame of reference 
that enables us to comprehend that which is immanent. The 
possibility of referring to that which transcends reality as such 
is contested, but all notions of a referent are elusive. On the 
basis of such observations various models of transcendence are 
identified before a semiotic notion is explored in more depth. It 
is suggested that the signified transcends the signifier by far 
and that some form of referent is necessary unless language is 
to become solipsistic. If so, there may be a need for clues to 
that which transcends reality as such. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Cornel du Toit has recognised the significance of the category of transcen-
dence throughout his quite considerable oeuvre. In a number of recent essays, 
noting how different disciplines contribute to an understanding of transcen-
dence (as one may expect from a scholar versed in science and religion 
discourse), he has explored notions such as horizontal transcendence and 
secular transcendence.1 At the core of his understanding of transcendence is 
the notion of shifting frontiers. The experience of transcendence (which is 
always something immanent) is one of crossing existing frontiers, in the 
process shifting such frontiers, only to recognise that this creates new 
frontiers. Accordingly, crossing frontiers is a hallmark of human nature. 
                                                 
1  See Cornel W. du Toit, “Shifting frontiers of transcendence in theology, philosophy and 
science”, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 67(1), Art. #879, 10 pages. 
doi.10.4102/hts.v67i1.879. Du Toit also edited a volume entitled Homo transcendentalis? 
Transcendence in science and religion: interdisciplinary perspectives (Unisa: Research 
Institute for Theology and Religion, 2010). He contributed three essays to this volume, 
including the article cited above that appeared as the leading essay in this volume and one 
on “Self-transcendence and eros: the human condition between desire and the infinite” (pp. 
77–102) and “Immanent transcendent angles on a post-reformation theology” (pp. 129–150). 
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 Du Toit also recognises that there are some frontiers that may never be 
crossed (like the Kantian Ding-an-sich). What may lie beyond such frontiers 
can never be known and may be called the “transcendent”, while the quite 
common experience of crossing frontiers may be described as one of 
transcendence (or, better, transcending). This should not be confused with a 
transcendental form of inquiry, especially associated with Immanuel Kant, 
where the very possibility of knowing anything (given that the Ding-an-sich 
is inaccessible), and not only the divine transcendent, is investigated. 
 In this contribution I will not engage directly with Du Toit’s own 
work on transcendence. Instead, I will focus on the category of the transcen-
dent (as the elusive referent) and explore the possibilities of a semiotic notion 
of transcendence.2 
 
Transcendence and the transcendent 
 
Experiences of transcendence are far more common and unproblematic than 
is sometimes assumed in secular discourse. Whenever we recognise that 
something is faster, richer, stronger, more intelligent, more efficient, more 
exhilarating, more traumatic, more beautiful, or wiser, that constitutes some 
form of transcendence. Transcendence is also evident in human experiences 
of (erotic) desire (being dissatisfied with what you have), encountering the 
extreme (with an array of marketed opportunities), acceleration, immersion, 
being forgiven, the exceeding of one’s anticipation, being loved, finding 
empathy, solidarity and hospitality, and exuberant joy. Transcendence is best 
appreciated through experiences of crossing a particular frontier. Those men 
who have run 100 metres in fewer than ten seconds will realise far better than 
I would what it took for Usain Bolt to set his series of world records. Yet, 
like anyone else, I may also wonder whether it would ever be possible to run 
100 metres flat in fewer than nine seconds without the help of a tailwind or 
performance-enhancing drugs. 
 One may add that it is only when one has reached a frontier and 
surmised what may lie beyond that frontier that one can appreciate what lies 
on this side of the frontier. Any act of gaining knowledge and insight consti-
tutes an experience of transcendence and implies the transcendence of the 
known by the one who knows. On this basis one may even say that it requires 
some tentative notion of the infinite to grasp anything that is finite to identify 
its form against an encompassing background. This also applies to any 
recognition of the negation of something (recognised in apophatic theology 
                                                 
2  For a proposed typology and comprehensive discussion of contemporary notions of 
transcendence, see the recent volumes edited by Wessel Stoker and Willie van der Merwe, 
namely Culture and transcendence: a typology of transcendence Louvain: Peeters, 2012) 
and Looking beyond? Shifting views of transcendence in theology, art, and politics 
(Amsterdam: Rudopi, 2012). 
A semiotic notion of transcendence 
 
and Hegel’s dialectical philosophy alike). Any form of mimesis likewise 
constitutes a transcending of that which has been given. Interpretation not 
only involves a “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer), but also a breaking open of 
one’s horizon. It is only when the boundary is reached that the journey to get 
there is understood. To develop a sense of being at home requires a journey 
of home-coming. The significance of the journey may become clear only by 
reaching the destination. The art of dying (ars moriendi), reaching that rather 
final frontier, is the key to the art of living, as many mystics have known, 
since death would otherwise always undermine the meaning of life. One’s 
sense of identity, too, cannot be captured merely through introspection or 
self-reflection; it is best understood differentially by being confronted with 
the radical and irreducible otherness of the other (alterity). That, too, is a 
frontier experience – one that is addressed in a wide variety of recent herme-
neutical (Ricoeur), phenomenological (Levinas), post-structuralist (Derrida) 
and feminist (Irigaray) philosophies. 
 On this basis one may argue that the possibility of experiences of 
transcendence should really not pose any obstacle in interdisciplinary dialo-
gue as long as it is recognised that such experiences of transcendence form 
part of this world, of immanent reality. Such experiences will therefore 
register as brain functions and are accessible for studies in the cognitive and 
social sciences, in literature, art and religion alike. The more problematic 
question has to do with the possibility of knowing the transcendent referent. 
The question is not whether we can experience something that transcends us; 
we evidently can. The more significant question has to do with what it is that 
transcends us and whether there is any way of grasping that.  
 Of course the easy answer is that we cannot know that, simply 
because, by definition, it transcends us. Some may urge the rest of us on 
theological or quasi-religious grounds not even to seek to penetrate this 
Mystery. It has to be protected as sacred. Any speculation about the Ultimate 
Mystery may merely degrade and banalise an understanding of radical human 
finitude. Nevertheless, in almost all human cultures and in science, art and 
religion alike, people seem to rush in where the proverbial angels fear to 
tread. In my view the simple truth is that we can indeed talk about that which 
is transcendent since we can extrapolate this from previous experiences of 
transcendence, where we came to know something that we had not known 
before. On this basis we can surmise what may lie in the extension of the 
frontiers crossed previously. This is what Michael Polanyi would call tacit, 
implied but not expressed knowledge.3 
 If it is important to recognise that all experiences of transcendence are 
immanent, it is equally important to recognise that all notions of the 
                                                 
3  For a helpful discussion and appropriation of Polanyi’s work in the context of Christian 
theology, see Lesslie Newbigin, The gospel in a pluralist society (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1989), especially pp. 1–65. 
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transcendent are socially constructed (and therefore also part of immanent 
reality). We really do not know what transcends us, but we can indeed 
construct it. Such experiences of the social construction of reality are equally 
common. This may be illustrated with the example of the University of the 
Western Cape where I am currently based: 
 Whenever the management, academic staff, students and their parents, 
workers, the press or outsiders use the word “UWC” (especially in the form 
“UWC is …”), they necessarily make a construction of what this word 
means. We need such a construction whenever we wish to refer to the univer-
sity. However, such a construction is incredibly presumptions. To understand 
what “UWC” actually means, one would need to know the whole history of 
turmoil at UWC, one needs to know all the staff, students (and their family 
situations), alumni and other role players, one needs to sit in on every class 
over a period of more than 50 years, read all the research outputs, follow all 
the sports activities, know all the buildings on campus and their history, listen 
to all the conversations on campus, have inside information on every 
financial transaction, read all emails directly or implicitly referring to UWC 
(I doubt that even God would want to do that), and have access to all the files 
on each computer on campus, be aware of community outreach projects and 
engage with conflicting perceptions of the university in the press and among 
outsiders.  
 It should be clear that whenever people use the abbreviation “UWC”, 
which is ordinarily done with the utmost ease, they do that on the basis of 
their own experiences, a minute fraction of what constitutes this “whole”. 
Indeed, it is quite remarkable that people can actually communicate with 
others in this way, when both conversation partners make their own con-
structions of what constitutes the whole on the basis of a recognisable 
common term (albeit pronounced differently and typed with distinct fonts). 
This is possible only on the basis of sufficiently overlapping connotations 
that are attached to the same term. Yet, the example also clarifies that any 
such constructions remain particular and unique. Given its history as a uni-
versity, established on the basis of the South African race classification 
system in the 1960s, its initial control by academics selected by the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, the unrest on campus since 1976, its significant contribution to 
the struggle against apartheid, its leftist orientation in the 1980s, its role in 
conceptualising a new constitution during the transition to democracy, and its 
struggle to establish itself as a prominent university after 1994, this is hardly 
surprising. The perceptions of the university (for example of the quality of its 
academic programmes and research), especially among outsiders, are deeply 
conflicting. Such perceptions are quite evident whenever people speak or 
write about UWC, often already in their tone of voice. This is by no means 
trivial as applications from prospective students and the employment of 
graduates are deeply shaped by such perceptions. 
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 The same pattern would apply whenever we dare to use words such as 
Cape Town, South Africa, Africa, world, earth, cosmos or universe, which 
we seem to do with the utmost ease. Such general categories do not neces-
sarily imply a form of distancing alienation, suggesting that we do not belong 
to the world and do not partake of its rhythms. It is our human way of 
situating ourselves, of using symbolic language for rapid communication, of 
answering life’s ultimate questions. Evidently, we are hardwired to use 
symbols and this has given us an immense evolutionary advantage. We are a 
symbol-making and symbol-carrying species. We uncover our identity by 
discovering the otherness of the other. There is no need or possibility to 
abolish every alien other. We know the inside only by guessing about the 
outside. We discover limits only by reaching borders that we cannot cross 
and by surmising what lies beyond such frontiers. Admittedly, language 
about the whole and what transcends the whole can easily become a tool of 
domination and oppression, of colonial conquest and occupation, of building 
empires. This occurs especially when those who dare to speak of the whole 
and what transcends the whole does so with too much confidence. Instead of 
seeking to avoid such categories it may be better to acknowledge our 
totalising strategies than to pretend that we can avoid them. This is akin to 
the language of confession amidst a “cloud of ‘unknowing’”. 
 The social construction of aspects of reality is widely accepted, as far 
as I can see. In each case this implies the recognition and naming of some 
form of the transcendent, for example the three letters “UWC”. The social 
construction of reality as a whole is probably as widely accepted in a variety 
of discourses, especially in sociology, cultural studies and religious studies. 
The concept “worldview” is typically used to describe the outcome of the 
social construction of reality. A worldview not only offers a view of the 
physical world (a cosmology); it also places the world within a comprehen-
sive system of meaning that can account for the origin and destiny of the 
world, the forces that govern it, our human place in it and human questions 
about meaning, suffering and evil. The term worldview may also be used in 
the plural, worldviews, thus assuming the possibility of adopting some meta-
position in order to compare different views of the world as such. Others may 
then recognise that meta-position as situated in another worldview that has 
not necessarily been self-evident to the one who offers the comparison. Either 
way, the most significant feature of a worldview is that one cannot view “the 
world”. It is necessarily socially constructed from within a particular environ-
mental embeddedness. While the referent, “world”, is always elusive, it is 
clearly not meaningless to talk about such a transcendent referent. 
 Moreover, in the philosophy and sociology of religion the possibility 
of the social construction of Ultimate Reality is also recognised. Here the 
Transcendent may be spelled with a capital letter to refer to that which 
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transcends or may transcend reality as a whole.4 This is contested by those 
with naturalistic assumptions. As Klaus Nürnberger observes, “Naturalism 
translated the methodological restriction of the sciences into a metaphysical 
axiom. For naturalism, nature is all there is. There is nothing beyond. 
Transcendence beyond immanent reality is a concept without a referent.”5 
Although the possibility of a referent that transcends reality as such would be 
denied by some, the social construction of Ultimate Reality/Mystery itself 
forms part of immanent reality and could be widely acknowledged. The 
question is therefore, more precisely, whether it is possible to speak of and 
even know a referent (like a divine creator) that transcends reality as such 
(which is awkwardly termed vertical or radical transcendence by some). It is 
fair to say that there is a tendency towards the sublimation of such a notion of 
transcendence under the cultural conditions of modernity and postmodernity 
alike. Where such a form of transcendence is still recognised, it has lost its 
metaphysical moorings.6 
 My argument thus far is that any notion of a referent is transcendent. 
It is indeed possible to speak about a transcendent and to surmise what it may 
be that transcends us. I now wish to add that this matters, given the tendency 
to interpret something by framing it in terms of a larger whole (a Gestalt). Or, 
in the categories of the sociology of knowledge: the social construction of 
reality is shaped by the social construction of Ultimate Reality. It matters, 
therefore, how we talk about the transcendent (as the example of branding 
UWC illustrates). This too is widely recognised wherever the influence of 
religion, for better, but alas all too often also for worse, is discussed in public 
forums. If so, it may help us to explore the relative adequacy of different 
models of understanding the transcendent referent. 
 
Models of the transcendent  
 
There are different clues that one may follow to speak about that which may 
transcend reality as such. One model is of course to assume that there is 
simply nothing that transcends reality since that would almost by definition 
be understood as part of reality. Nethertheless, this denial of any possibility 
of the Transcendent does not seem to satisfy everyone. It crops up in 
religious notions of the divine, but also in questions asked by physicists and 
mystics alike: Where does the Big Bang come from? Why is there something 
                                                 
4  Klaus Nürnberger labels this “radical transcendence” and suggests that “God” is the name 
we use for the pivotal centre and transcendent referent of a system of meaning that covers 
the whole of reality as this is reflected in human consciousness. See Nürnberger’s Regaining 
sanity for the earth (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster, 2011), p. 144 and also his essay “Immanent 
transcendence and radical transcendence: the pivotal issue between a Christian theology and 
a naturalistic metaphysic” in Du Toit (ed.): Homo transcendentalis?, pp. 103–127. 
5  Nürnberger, “Immanent transcendence and radical transcendence”, p. 105. 
6  See Van der Merwe in Looking beyond?, p. 508. 
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and not nothing? Why is the universe so comprehensible? Why can reality be 
modeled mathematically? Why is it so incredibly large and so amazingly 
beautiful? Radical immanence is only possible if any notion of Ultimate 
Reality is denied in order to insist that only what is immanent is real. 
 Another model of transcendence widely explored in Western 
continental philosophy is that of self-transcendence (a tautology), usually 
understood in terms of the intentional agency, self-actualisation (or trans-
ascendance), innate desire or imagination of the human subject who is 
“hardwired” for such transcendence.7 While this is helpful to account for the 
common experience of transcendence, on its own it would hardly suffice as 
an answer to the question "What is it that transcends reality as such?" Yes, 
we transcend ourselves, but at least such an understanding of the “Self” 
would need to be enlarged in a non-anthropocentric way to remain plausible 
– or otherwise it would become as solipsistic as radical forms of German 
idealism. Whether this implies the need for a “vertical” (Levinas) and not 
only a “horizontal” notion of transcendence (as Du Toit recommends) is 
contested.8 
 There are not that many other alternatives available. Consider the 
following: 
 Firstly, it is possible to seek answers to questions about the Ultimate 
Origin or Source or Cause of things. Even though that cannot be known, this 
has not prevented rampant speculation. Again not many answers are available 
and the answers that are available are not equally palatable: Is it a matter of 
deterministic law, random chance, inevitability (the three basic options 
explored by physicists), intelligent design or a wicked complot (assuming 
some intentional agency)? Or does an interplay between these offer a better 
solution? If the role of some deity could be entertained I would prefer one 
who did not first develop a blueprint, but one who would allow for the same 
mix that a couple’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse to have a baby 
would entail: a vague plan, allowing some chance followed by a fixed pattern 
for the development of the foetus and then an interplay between all of the 
above. A blueprint to determine the child’s IQ, musical ability, name, 
                                                 
7  See Du Toit, “Self-transcendence and Eros” (2010). 
8  See Wessel Stoker, Is geloven redelijk? (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2004), p. 110f. See also the 
typology of notions of transcendence developed by Stoker in which he distinguishes 
between radical transcendence, immanent transcendence, radical immanence and 
transcendence as alterity. See Stoker, “Culture and Transcendence: A Typology” in Culture 
and Transcendence, p. 5-26. I am not following this proposed typology (discussing the 
possibility of “radical” transcendence), or the contrasts between horizontal and vertical 
transcendence (as Du Toit suggests), or radical and immanent transcendence (as Nürnberger 
suggests) here. Instead, my aim is to show how that experiences of transcendence are indeed 
very common, but that the referent of that which transcends us always remains elusive – 
whether in the form of knowledge of reality, knowledge of the other or of the world as such. 
This need not be contested. What is contested is whether it is meaningful to speak of a 
referent that transcends the whole of reality (i.e., Ultimate Reality). 
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marriage partner, career, date of death and so forth from the outset would be 
diabolic. 
 Secondly, what transcends reality as such may be understood in terms 
of the Ultimate Destiny of history. This allows for ways in which the future 
seems to outweigh the present in ordinary human experience. If today is bad, 
tomorrow may be better. The question may be asked with narrower or wider 
frames of reference to include the meaning of my life and my career, the 
ubiquitous question about what will happen to me when I die, the destiny of 
institutions and corporations, of language and culture, of life on this planet 
and of the universe itself. Again, ultimately there seems to be very few 
options available. The scenarios for the universe in the far future suggest only 
two options and both are rather unpalatable: being “fried” or being “frozen”. 
 Thirdly, one may seek to capture the elusive centre of something. This 
is a question that is raised when an individual subject, family, organisation or 
government seeks to describe its own identity. This cannot be done – as the 
critique of essentialism clearly suggests – but nevertheless has to be done 
precisely in order to distinguish the one from the other. The quest for iden-
tity, for the elusive centre of subjectivity,9 can also be associated with larger 
wholes. This is evident, for example, when questions about the meaning of 
this very moment, the meaning of life, the meaning of history and the 
meaning of the universe are raised. This is not so much a question about 
origins and destinies but about the elusive present. It may be that there is no 
such meaning, that the universe is pointless, but like the infamous comment 
by Stephen Weinberg, most of us would tend to regret having dared to say 
something like that. 
 Fourthly, attempts to surmise what may transcend reality as such 
could focus on what constitutes “the whole”. If one knows something 
partially one may wonder what the whole looks like. In what way is the 
whole bigger than the sum of its parts? In the well-known parable of the blind 
men and the elephant the men may eventually feel their way around to 
recognise the elephant as a whole. Yet such a holistic approach is rather more 
elusive and presumptuous than is often admitted. The blind men may not be 
able to see the whole elephant, but no one else can do that either. What 
constitutes the whole cannot be captured – as the example of UWC above 
illustrates – since we know only tiny fragments of that whole. Yet we seem 
perfectly able to talk about that whole. Physicists may hope to be able to 
come up eventually with a “theory of everything” and thus “to know the 
mind of God”, but that would never mean that they would know everything.  
 The difficulties around the question "What constitutes the whole?" are 
radicalised in the life sciences and the social sciences, given the need to 
recognise levels of complexity and emergence. Here the term “dimensions” 
                                                 
9  See Du Toit, “Self-transcendence and eros”, p. 92f. 
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may be used as a metaphor to describe such levels of complexity. Following 
the work of George Ellis, one may speak of a hierarchy of increasing com-
plexity where social systems such as languages, the economy and forms of 
governance are recognised to be part of the ever more elusive whole of 
reality. In more traditional categories the need to distinguish between the 
visible and the invisible has been recognised in Greek philosophy, in the 
biblical texts, in Patristic Christianity and in traditional African culture alike. 
Not everything can be seen. The connections between visible things require 
deeper insight. Love may be evident and even palpably “in the air tonight”, 
but it cannot be seen. One needs to “see”, but not with one’s eyes only. 
Multiple levels of “seeing” are required, namely seeing and appreciating 
forms at the surface level, perceiving (seeing by filling in some missing 
details), seeing connections between events, developing deeper insight and 
having some foresight. Who, then, can fathom what constitutes the whole, 
not to mention what transcends that whole in space, time and complexity? 
Yet we seem perfectly able to talk about that Transcendent, and how that is 
socially constructed affects how everything else is done. 
 A fifth model to speak about that which transcends reality as such is 
born from the tension between seeing what something is and sensing what it 
should be. This is witnessed in the “ethical turn” to transcendence as alterity. 
In English this ambiguity is inscribed in the concept “vision”. It captures 
what is visible, seeing that in a wider perspective and an attractive moral 
vision for the future. Likewise, there may well be tension because reality is 
seen from different perspectives. There is a world of difference between 
seeing a piece of land as nothing but a rubbish dump and seeing it as God’s 
own garden; between seeing someone as a hardened gangster and seeing him 
as a child loved by his parents. In the inimitable words of Desmond Tutu: 
 
People really are wonderful. This does not mean that people 
cannot be awful and do real evil. They can. Yet as you begin to 
see with the eyes of God, you start to realize that people’s 
anger and hatred and cruelty come from their own pain and 
suffering. As we begin to see their words and behaviour as 
simply the acting out of their suffering, we can have compas-
sion for them.10 
 
It is possible to say that “a different world is possible”, to speak prophetically 
about a society that has never been. This ability to see what others do not see 
distinguishes persons such as Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King (jr), 
Mother Theresa and Nelson Mandela. In fact, they are rightly famous for 
                                                 
10  Desmond M. Tutu, God has a dream: a vision of hope for our time (New York: Double Day, 
2005, 97). 
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that; their faces are instantly recognised by UWC first-year Ethics students 
that was asked to identify them.  
 Questions about ultimate meaning offer another route for recognising 
transcendence: Why is there something? Why can reality be modelled mathe-
matically? Why is it comprehensible? What is the purpose of life? Where do 
we as humans belong and where can we find a home? Are we damned by the 
guilt of the past, or are we ultimately forgiven sinners free to create a new 
future? What convictions can guide us in a world that is far too complex to 
establish the truth of everything we may come across?  
 
A semiotic notion of the transcendent  
 
I have argued above that the possibility of speaking about experiences of 
transcendence and the transcendent referent is more widely recognised than is 
sometimes admitted. It is not the domain of religion or theology alone. It 
should be noted that reference to any divine Transcendent would be appro-
priate, but not necessary, in order to recognise the legitimacy of speaking 
about the transcendent. I have outlined various models of speaking about the 
transcendent and suggested that the way in which this is done is by no means 
trivial. Even though the transcendent is necessarily elusive (because it trans-
cends us), it influences how we think, speak and act, how we form habits and 
cultures, how we shape civilisations. In what follows below I will identify 
and describe one further model of speaking about transcendence, namely a 
semiotic notion of the transcendent. 
 One of the distinguishing characteristics of the human species is its 
ability to use signs to refer to something that is not immediately present. 
Homo sapiens, it is often said, is a symbol-carrying species. This ability to 
communicate through the use of symbols has given us an evolutionary 
advantage over other primates and hominids. One may even argue that the 
distinctiveness of human existence lies here: that we as a symbol-carrying 
species participate in a journey of discovery in which we understand our-
selves only in terms of that which, we surmise, lies beyond ourselves. 
 Signs may carry a rich set of connotations (the so-called signified) that 
are not fully captured by the material signifier, but which the signifier 
connotes. Signs do not necessarily participate in that which they signify. 
Thus a road sign “Cape Town 1000 km” (with only 14 characters) outside 
Bloemfontein refers to Cape Town – including connotations with Table 
Mountain, Cape Point, Robben Island, the ocean and peninsula, District Six, 
the Cape Flats, the surrounding vineyards, numerous buildings, neighbour-
hoods, inhabitants, family members and friends living there, history, politics, 
arts and sports that are attached to that sign. However, the sign itself is not 
part of Cape Town.  
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 By contrast, symbols do participate in that which they symbolise. The 
South African flag, for example, represents everything that being a South 
African supporter entails at a major sports event, even if the flag is hoisted on 
foreign soil. Symbols can carry multiple layers of meaning. In the case of the 
flag it captures something of the geology, geography, topography and demo-
graphy of the nation state (which is admittedly contested), but also something 
of its social fabric, its many languages, cultures and contested histories. It 
also carries with it the values and visions embedded in the current South 
African constitution, which are immediately recognised, emotionally and 
otherwise, when contrasted with the previous South African flag. 
 Metaphors are also signs that are employed to highlight (or create) 
connotations by seeing something in the light of something else. Some philo-
sophers would argue that all forms of language are rooted in metaphors. They 
invite us to see the world “as if” (Sallie McFague). Through human imagina-
tion signs may also refer to a vision for the future, to a society that does not 
exist yet, but which may come about through dreaming that “a different 
world is possible”. Indeed, this role of the imagination is crucial in planning 
for the future, individually and collectively. Consider signs that refer to a 
house to be built, a degree to be obtained, a company to be established or a 
policy to be introduced. In each case the meaning of the sign (the signified) 
transcends the materiality of the sign exponentially, but the material signifier 
is the only access that we have to such meaning. 
 In the classic structuralism of De Saussure the relation between a 
signifier and the signified is understood as being defined differentially. In 
post-structuralist theories this relation became destabilised in terms of the 
play of signifiers that Derrida famously described with the term différance. 
He speaks of an ongoing trace where signs are in constant movement and 
vanishes like footprints in the sand without an indication of an original or 
“true” meaning. However, if language is indeed discourse (Ricoeur), and thus 
communication, some notion of the signified would need to be maintained.11 
The signified clearly includes a set of connotations attached to a signifier that 
is socially constructed, but include allusions to “the world” out there. What 
about the possibility of a referent, however? Does a sign refer to something 
outside itself? This has been a long-standing problem in semiotic and herme-
neutical theories, also in biblical exegesis.12 It may be true that our only 
access to the world is mediated through language (a set of signifiers). How-
ever, to say that there is nothing outside language seems counter-intuitive, 
especially if cosmic and evolutionary history is factored in. Can language 
                                                 
11  This is Ricoeur’s famous argument in Interpretation theory: discourse and the surplus of 
meaning (Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1976). Language is in the first place a 
form of communicative discourse, not only a system of signs. 
12  See Bernard C. Lategan and Willem S. Vorster, Text and reality: aspects of reference in 
biblical texts (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). 
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enable us to refer to that which presumably exists outside of language? This 
is as elusive as the Kantian Ding-an-sich. Short of solipsism it seems to make 
sense to speak about such a referent, but it is not something that can be 
known. The referent (also the world of possibilities entertained in fiction) is 
socially constructed, but that does not and cannot mean that the world, 
including the physical universe, exists purely because it is constructed by us. 
The paradox is that we human beings are, but at the same time cannot be, our 
own makers. 
 The least we can say is that a sign (or a set of signifiers) can provide 
us with some pointers to both a possible world of connotations (the signified) 
and even to the elusive referent. Again, the connotations exceed the signifier 
exponentially so that this is a particularly powerful form of transcendence. 
With three simple letters we can refer to every connotation that may be 
attached to “UWC” and everything that UWC stands for. The referent 
transcends the signifier by far, to put it mildly. This is extended even further 
by the possibility of split references, for example through the use of meta-
phors, so that references can function simultaneously at multiple levels. 
 Given such a semiotic notion of transcendence one may also employ 
the word “transparence” (derived from Teilhard de Chardin13) to overcome 
the sometimes arid tension between immanence and transcendence. The 
symbol opens up new horizons of meaning if one would dare to look through 
the “window” of such symbols. The physicality and “literality” of the sign 
have to be taken seriously, but only in order to be guided by the sign to the 
signified and the referent. It would be a shame to confuse the sign, “Cape 
Town 1000 km” (or the signpost when entering the city) with the city of Cape 
Town itself. 
 
Some theological considerations  
 
In a secularised context God-talk has often been discredited as escapist 
because a particular model of transcendence has become outdated. This is the 
cosmological understanding of transcendence associated with a more or less 
flat earth, with the heavenly firmament above and the underworld below. 
Although the Bible was largely written in the frame of reference provided by 
such an understanding of the world, such a spatial model of transcendence is 
no longer tenable following the work of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Ein-
stein and various more recent physicists. Of course the biblical authors were 
not as naïve as is sometimes assumed. They recognised the distinction 
between the visible and the invisible as readily as we might speak about 
complexity. They probably used the term “heaven” anagogically as the most 
                                                 
13  See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Divine Milieu (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1960), 
pp. 130–131. 
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readily available clue for what transcends us. This clue is still instantly 
recognised by children and astrophysicists alike when they gaze in wonder at 
the stars on a clear night in the vast Karoo. To look “up” is to shrink in size. 
 On the basis of a semiotic notion of transcendence one may argue that 
almost anything could be or become a locus where some form of transcend-
ence could be recognised and traced. In each case such an awareness of 
transcendence evokes notions of the transcendent. Yet, in each case our 
metaphors, images, concepts and models of the transcendent cannot be 
equated with what is transcendent. Such concepts necessarily remain part of 
the world in which we live. This applies especially, but not only, to the role 
of symbols. What is transcendent is necessarily elusive – as philosophic 
reflection on the (im)possibility of identifying the referent of a sign illus-
trates. 
 John Calvin recognised the role played by symbols and developed a 
highly sophisticated (at least for this time) understanding of signification. He 
employed that in his views on exegesis, on the sacraments, on the incarnation 
and so forth. He recognised the importance of the materiality of signs and 
therefore emphasised the role played by the human senses. His emphasis on 
the ear as the vehicle through which God’s Word may be heard is well 
known, but he equally emphasised visual metaphors (Scripture as spectacles, 
the role of mirrors, illumination by a flash of lightning and the theatre of 
God’s glory) and did not exclude the other senses (smell, taste, feeling and 
even intuition).14 Symbols are indeed palpable, tangible and accessible to 
human experience. They are material, bodily and earthly, perhaps also 
monetary. 
 Calvin recognised that symbols are more than signs since they 
participate in that which they symbolise. He understood that an image will 
remain dead without the word. However, the word does not necessarily come 
first, only to be illustrated by the image. As Randall Zachman points out, the 
word elucidates and accompanies the image in all its materiality and 
palpability. The word guides us to sense the direction in which the sign is 
pointing in order to gather the fuller meaning of the symbol.15 The word is 
not concretised by the sacrament. The word is spoken at the table primarily 
to build the fellowship of the household, but also to reveal and thus to heal 
the brokenness, to identify Judas the traitor more clearly, to reveal our 
consumerist idolatries and dependencies in the act of consuming the bread 
and the wine. 
 Following in the footsteps of Calvin, two crucial aspects have to be 
emphasised. These may be illustrated with the example of biblical exegesis 
                                                 
14  See the study by Cornelis van der Kooi, Als in een Spiegel: God Kennen volgens Calvijn en 
Barth (Kampen: J. H. Kok, 2002). 
15  See the study by Randall Zachman, Image and Word in the Theology of John Calvin (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).\ 
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(or of the sacraments). On the one hand: In reading the biblical texts it is 
important not to reduce the meaning of the text to the letters of the text. It is 
necessary to capture the “spirit” of the text, that is, what it communicates and 
conveys, what it reveals to us about God, its meaning for us today (the city of 
Cape Town entails far more than the signpost outside Bloemfontein). On the 
other hand: We can only have access to the spirit of the text through the 
“letter”, that is, by engaging in the hard work of detailed, disciplined and, 
where required, scientific exegesis (since we cannot know everything that 
Cape Town stands for, only small fragments of it). Any short cut to the 
spiritual meaning, for example through the use of allegories or direct illumi-
nation, therefore ought to be avoided. Perhaps what is needed here is a 
pneumatological approach to the meaning of symbols that can detect the 
inhabitation of the Spirit both in the materiality of a symbol and in the 
fullness of what it symbolises. It is the Spirit who installs in such symbols an 
ability to signify God. 
 This is of crucial significance for entertaining the question “Who is 
God?” We do not have any direct access to God. Any knowledge of God 
cannot come straight from “above”, but can only come from below, from 
within the world in which we live, from that which is material, bodily and 
earthly. Also, if we claim that such knowledge was revealed by God, we 
would only know that through our human experience and not in any direct 
way. Any claim of divine intervention, of the occurrence of “miracles” could 
only be recognised as such from within our world. Again, we do not have any 
direct access to God. For anyone to claim that we do would be to reduce God 
to something in our world. It would be to create our own idols, to read our 
own views into symbols or to claim authority for private, so-called immediate 
illumination. To prevent and discipline such claims we have to recognise the 
path through which knowledge of God may be discerned, namely through the 
use of symbols. Again, the meaning of the symbol can only be discerned on 
the basis of the materiality of the symbol – also because the symbol itself 
participates in that which it symbolises.  
 At the same time, the meaning of the symbols transcends its materiali-
ty by far. When we employ metaphors for God (rock, anchor, wind, hen or 
father) we have to recognise that we cannot grasp such connotations fully. 
We cannot capture or contain God through the metaphors and symbols we 
employ. If we do, we would only create idols. Every metaphor illuminates 
some aspects that may have remained hidden previously. However, every 
metaphor also remains limited. God may in some ways be like a rock or a 
father, but there are even more ways in which God is not like a rock or a 
human father. This requires a sense of theological humility and a recognition 
that we are at best nothing more than witnesses to God’s elusive presence in 
our midst. In speaking about God (or to God), we need to recognise that our 
language would always remain inadequate to express the inexpressible, but 
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that we could and should search for relative adequacy. It matters! To use an 
analogy: There is no perfect way to declare one’s love, but it does matter how 
this is done. It can be messed up disastrously. 
 On this basis one may recognise numerous manifestations of God’s 
presence in our world. Almost everything may function as a symbol. In the 
well-known words of the non-Christian poet Rabindranath Tagore, “I asked 
the tree, speak to me about God, and it blossomed.” One may find traces of 
the Holy Spirit at work in the world almost anywhere, indeed everywhere, 
also in the history of the human species, in other religious traditions, in non-
human nature and in the story of the universe itself. However, these traces are 
not always equally clear. In terms of a famous image that Calvin used, these 
traces may provide a flash of lightning during the dark of night, but the 
moment of light is not enough to assist one in finding the way home, if one is 
hopelessly lost in a stormy night. Or, to use another image, the detective on 
the crime scene may find numerous traces, perhaps too many to follow up, 
but would need to recognise the most significant traces as potential clues and 
follow those leads further in order to identify the culprit. Only on this basis 
may the significance of several less evident clues be recognised retro-
spectively and employed to build up a strong case. 
 Which clues will help us to fathom the mystery? According to the 
Christian confession, the triune God is the deepest secret, the Mystery, the 
Geheimnis of the world. Christians find the best available clue to this Ulti-
mate Mystery in the person and work of Jesus Christ and through the trans-
formative presence of the Holy Spirit. This witness suggests that in Jesus 
Christ one may find a far clearer picture, the best available clue, of the 
identity and character of this God. Indeed, here one may find a manifestation 
of God’s presence among human beings. In fact, one may declare doxolo-
gically that he is indeed truly God (vere Deus), although it should be noted 
that the inverse, that God is Jesus, is typically not claimed (although Thomas 
Altizer is a notable exception). In this way the Christian confession offers a 
specifically Christian interpretation of the world (of nature and of life) in 
conversation with other disciplines and perspectives. This witness remains 
nothing more than a clue to help us fathom a mystery that cannot be 
fathomed. Yet, at least for some of us, it remains the best available clue, one 
that offers us some comfort in matters of life and death. 
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